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Abstract
This article examines the New Partnership for Africa’s Development initiative launched in
2001. The article discusses the political and economic conjuncture that resulted in the adoption of this initiative. In the main, the analysis demonstrates the ways in which the initiative
dovetails well with the global neo-liberal project and, consequently, contests the claims by
African ruling elites and their counter-parts in the global North that it represents a transformative framework for economic and political change for national social formations in Africa.
La globalización y las políticas de cambio en Africa: NEPAD y los fallos del desarrollismo elitista transnacional
Este artículo examina la iniciativa de la Nueva Alianza para el Desarrollo de Africa lanzada
en 2001. El artículo analiza la coyuntura política y económica que resultó de la adopción
de la iniciativa. En su conjunto, el análisis demuestra la forma en que la iniciativa casa bien
con el proyecto global neoliberal y, en consecuencia, rechaza la pretensión de las élites africanas y sus contrapartidas en el Norte global. Esta iniciativa representa un esquema transformador para el cambio político y económico en la sociedad africana.
Globalisation et politiques de transformation en Afrique: NEPAD et dangers de développementalisme d’une élite transnationale
Cet article examine le Nouveau Partenariat pour le Développement de l’Afrique, une initiative lancée en 2001. Cet article parle de la conjoncture politique et économique qui a
découlé de l’adoption de cette initiative. Dans l’ensemble, cette analyse démontre comment
cette initiative se raccorde avec le projet global néolibéral et, par conséquent, conteste les
revendications de l’élite africaine au pouvoir et de ses homologues du Nord. Cette initiative
procure enﬁn une structure de transformation économique et politique pour la formation
nationale et sociale en Afrique.
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Introduction
Current discourses on international political economy generally contend
that the decade of the 1970s generated signiﬁcant shifts in economic, intellectual and political spheres that continue to shape national and global
developments. On the economic level, these discourses claim that the
period saw the emergence of a serious global recession characterized by
decline in production, high inﬂation, crisis of proﬁts for the majority of
ﬁrms, technological developments, rise in government deﬁcits and massive
layoﬀs for workers. These economic developments and major changes in
the political landscape of major countries in the global North in the late
1970s and early 1980s – the rise of Margaret Thatcher in the UK, Helmut
Kohl in Germany and Ronald Reagan in the United States – and intellectual shifts that called for the dismantling of the global Keynesian economic
framework are highlighted as core factors that ushered in a new phase of
globalization underpinned by neo-liberal economic discourse.
In the context of African countries, analysts argue that these global economic, political and intellectual shifts have had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
the continent’s development process. In the economic realm, for instance,
the core features of the neo-liberal economic globalization are said to have
contributed to an economic downward spiral in most African countries.
These countries, however, are not the only ones that have faced major economic crisis, for as John Rapley has argued, the crisis of capital accumulation has been a core feature of the current phase of globalization in all parts
of the world.1 In essence, the onset of this phase of globalization marked
the end of the post-1945 ‘golden age’ of global capitalism which had seen
signiﬁcant economic growth in the global North and various parts of the
global South. In Africa, the crisis of postcolonial capitalism was characterized by a serious economic crisis, evidenced by decline in economic surplus,
levels of investment and savings, inability of African states to meet their
debt obligations to public and private lenders, and failure of these states to
maintain what Yusuf Bangura has termed the post-colonial social contract.2
The developments that emerged globally in the 1970s have, over the
years, seen states institute various economic and political strategies in
eﬀorts to address the economic crises and other contradictions generated
1)

Rapley 2004.
For detailed discussions of the various elements of this crisis see, Ihonvbere 2000;
Bangura 1992.
2)
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by neo-liberal globalization. This paper’s objective is to examine the ways
in which African states have responded to neo-liberal globalization, with a
speciﬁc focus on their New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)
initiative. The underlying argument of the paper is that African states, like
other states elsewhere, have not been bystanders in the evolution of the
contemporary phase of globalization and other global shifts that characterize the current global conjuncture. Situating my arguments within the
critical international political economy intellectual tradition,3 the paper
argues that the launching of NEPAD demonstrates the political agency of
these states but contends that their agency is mediated by local and global
factors and thus challenges the dominant theoretical perspectives to studies on African states especially the neoliberal approach that tends to represent their agency as unfettered in the current phase of globalization. The
paper has three sections. In eﬀorts to contextualize the discussion on
NEPAD section one highlights the ways in which the constitutive ideas
framing neo-liberal economic globalization shaped Africa’s development
discourse in the pre-NEPAD era. Section two critically examines the core
features of the NEPAD initiative while section three demonstrates the
limitations of the initiative as a blueprint for Africa’s development in the
contemporary phase of the historical process of globalization.

Contexualizing NEPAD: Neo-liberal Globalization and the
Emergence of a New Development Discourse in Africa
Over the last two decades, the emergence and evolution of neo-liberal globalization has greatly shaped Africa’s economic and political processes. On
the economic front, this development has seen the rise of a new development paradigm that borrows heavily from the constitutive ideas that
underpin global neoliberalism, such as calls for a limited role of the state
in the economic arena, cuts in social spending, valorization of private capital and the promotion of international free trade. In speciﬁc terms this
discourse has explained Africa’s economic crisis and stagnation as being a
result of the state’s extensive role in economic aﬀairs, especially through

3)
Here I am referring to the following texts that use a Neo-Gramscian political economy
approach to study state formation and shifts in global capitalism among other political
economy related issues. See: Cox 1987; Robinson 2004; Gill 1993, 1997.
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the expansion of publicly owned enterprises in the postcolonial period.4
Other contributing factors to the continent’s economic crisis as articulated
by advocates of neo-liberal restructuring are extensive trade protection
measures, such as high tariﬀs and licensing procedures, and overvalued
currencies. In addition, agricultural policies, especially the practice of paying small-scale producers limited returns for their products and the decline
of agricultural exports in the 1970s, are also highlighted as contributing to
economic stagnation and crisis. The expenditure patterns followed by
postcolonial governments of providing subsidies in agriculture and in
social sectors such as education and health, and the expansion of the civil
service are also highlighted as factors.
With the rise of a neo-liberal development paradigm and in response to
the serious economic crisis that came to a head in most African countries
in the late 1970s, African states have, over the last two decades, implemented core elements of the neo-liberal economic globalization agenda. In
line with neo-liberal development thought these states, at serious cost to
many people, especially women and children, have cut spending in various
social sectors. In the health sector for instance, neo-liberal reforms that call
for the introduction of a market-based approach to health service provision have resulted in increases in health costs – a process that has, in the
case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, seen a decline in women seeking prenatal care and hospital visits for young children.5 Neo-liberal
reforms have also been implemented in education, a development that has
facilitated the deepening of the gender gap that has historically existed in
this sector.6 Other reforms have included layoﬀs of public sector workers
in the eﬀort to achieve what various reports from the World Bank on Africa
term as the ‘rationalization’ of the civil service.7
Privatization of publicly owned enterprises is another element of neoliberal economic reform. As African countries entered a period of serious
economic crisis, their reliance on public enterprises as engines of economic
growth came under heavy criticism by scholars working within the new
development paradigm of neoliberalism and the international lending
4)

World Bank 1981, p. 37.
Turshen 1994, p. 81.
6)
For extended discussion on the impact of neo-liberal based reforms on the education
sector in various African countries see, Tsikata and Kerr 2000.
7)
For seminar reports from the World Bank on neo-liberal restructuring in Africa see
World Bank 1981, 1989, 1994.
5)
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community and its leading institutions such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. According to supporters of neoliberal economic reforms, public enterprises were largely responsible for the African
continent’s limited development and economic crisis because they were
ineﬃcient, created rent-seeking opportunities, and stiﬂed the entrepreneurial spirit.
These core measures of neo-liberal economic restructuring described
above were by the late 1980s deemed inadequate for the transformation of
African economic development along modern capitalist lines. Consequently,
by the late 1980s, advocates of the neo-liberal development paradigm
begun to call for reforms in Africa’s political arena. As a World Bank seminar report declared in 1989, the economic problems of the continent were
also due to political practices: “Underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of governance. . . . [a] deep political malaise [that]
stymies action in most countries.”8 The discourse on political reforms
highlighted the lack of good governance frameworks as a factor that had
led to economic crisis, extensive personalised forms of rule, human rights
abuses, and limited foreign investment, due to an ineﬃcient judiciary that
had failed to “protect property and enforce contracts.”9
This trend, according to this line of thought, also led to high levels of
corruption, waste and lack of economic development in most of Africa.
Thus, according to advocates of good governance, changes to regime structures were necessary for the economic and political recovery of the continent. By the late 1980s, the debate on political reforms had evolved beyond
calls for good governance practices to include the promotion of the establishment of multiparty democratic states. In contrast to their earlier development paradigm, which supported the establishment of ‘development
dictatorships’ in the periphery, their new discourse no longer upheld dictators and their authoritarian strong-arm regimes as the foundation for economic development. Consequently, multiparty democracy (along with
other terms such as governance, human rights and free markets) in Africa
and other parts of the global South occupied a prominent place in the
development discourse of the international lending community who
utilised foreign aid as a powerful tool in the push for its establishment.
While the global elite driven twin project of promoting market-led capitalism and democracy in Africa in this era of globalization continued to
8)
9)

World Bank 1989, p. xii.
World Bank 1989, p. 9.
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shape development discourse in Africa and elsewhere in the global South, by
the late 1990s this project was increasingly being challenged from various
sites. In the main, for analysts of Africa’s development, the nirvana that
advocates of the neo-liberal development model had promised had not
emerged. Instead study after study of Washington Consensus policies in
Africa demonstrated the failure of these policies as a model for equitable and
democratic development. As one analyst has stated:
the anticipation [economic recovery and development] proved to be false. Balanceof-payments gaps were often narrowed, but by less than expected and only temporarily. The beneﬁts of reforms were often overwhelmed by the eﬀects of adverse external
shocks-like the collapse of export prices. New investment failed to appear. Indeed, the
demand-restraint policies encouraged by the IMF depressed investment instead of
increasing it, and many African economies continued to stagnate in the 1980s.10

These sentiments were expressed in various reports by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), in one of which was stated:
Economic turnaround had not occurred in almost all of the countries that had tried
SAPs . . . Even the countries that followed adjustment programmes with the most rigor
were barely holding their ground. Most were suﬀering further set-backs including
high inﬂation, lower spending on health, education, housing, sanitation and water.
Also, laying oﬀ people from their jobs or the declining real wages caused suﬀering to
reach unbearable proportions.11

The evident failure of the neo-liberal development model did not deter its
advocates from claiming that this model had beneﬁted African societies
especially the poor. For the World Bank for instance,
the poor are mostly rural, and as producers, they tend to beneﬁt from agricultural,
trade and exchange rate reforms . . . As consumers, both the urban and the rural poor
tend to be hurt by rising food prices. But adjustment policies have seldom had a major
impact on food prices in either the open or the parallel market, which supplies most
of the poor.12

This claim contradicts empirical evidence from various parts of Africa and
the fact that most of the IMF riots in the continent whether in Zambia,
10)
11)
12)

Lancaster 1993, p. 16.
Minter 1992, p. 16.
Quoted in Bond 2001.
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Sudan or Tunisia emerged following the hiking of food prices due to other
Washington Consensus policies of currency devaluation and cutting food
subsidies. It is in the context of increasingly local and global (the antiglobalization riots in Settle among others) discontent with neo-liberal economic restructuring that African states emerged with the NEPAD initiative
that they claimed would led not only to economic recovery but to an African Renaissance characterized by sustainable economic growth and democratic politics. It is to a discussion of NEPAD I turn to next.

Response to Neo-liberal Globalization: African States’ NEPAD
Initiative
The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) emerged in
October 2001 when African Presidents launched it at the Organization of
African Unity (now African Union) meeting in Abuja.13 Prior to this
launch, however, African citizens had not heard of this initiative. African
elites especially Thabo Mbeki had consulted widely with global North
political elites such as Tony Blair and had presented a draft version of
NEPAD (New African Initiative) to G8 leaders at their meeting in Genoa
in July 2001.
The NEPAD initiative outlines what it conceives as the origins of Africa’s underdevelopment and oﬀers an economic and political roadmap
geared to addressing the continent’s perpetual crisis of development and
“exclusion in a globalising world.”14 The document highlights ﬁve developments as being the sources of Africa’s underdevelopment. First, it claims
that the evolution of the global economic system has resulted in Africa
being relegated to the role of producing primary commodities for international markets and as a reserve for cheap labour. This global division of
labour has contributed greatly to the continent’s economic stagnation
since, “of necessity, [it] has meant the draining of Africa’s resources rather
than their use for the continent’s development. . . . Thus, Africa remains the
poorest continent despite being one of the most richly endowed regions of
the world.”15

13)
14)
15)

NEPAD 2001.
NEPAD 2001, p. 1.
NEPAD 2001, p. 5
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Second, the document argues that the nature of colonial economic and
political structures laid the foundation that would haunt the continent’s
development for a long time. The era of European colonialism led to the
deepening of the continent’s integration into the global system on unequal
terms as mainly a producer of primary commodities for the industrial
needs of the colonizing powers, and to the establishment of weak state
structures. In the main,
colonialism subverted hitherto traditional structures, institutions and values or made
them subservient to the economic and political needs of the imperial powers. It also
retarded the development of an entrepreneurial class, as well as a middle class with
skills and managerial capacity.16

Third, postcolonial political and economic developments did not usher in
a new period of democratic and sustained economic growth. According to
NEPAD,
At independence, virtually all the new states were characterised by a shortage of skilled
professionals and a weak capitalist class, resulting in a weakening of the accumulation
process. Post-colonial Africa inherited weak states and dysfunctional economies,
which were further aggravated by poor leadership, corruption and bad governance in
many countries. Africa’s experience shows that the rate of accumulation in the postcolonial period has not been suﬃcient to rebuild societies in the wake of colonial
underdevelopment, or to sustain improvement in the standard of living. This has had
deleterious consequences on the political process and led to sustained patronage and
corruption.17

Fourth, while emphasising the role of local historical conditions in facilitating dependency and the emergence of undemocratic and weak states,
the document argues that international conditions in the immediate postcolonial era were no less important. In particular, “the divisions caused by
the Cold War hampered the development of accountable governments
across the continent.”18 Fifth, even after twenty years of neo-liberal reforms,
the document declares that the fundamental characteristics of African
states remain: weak, underpinned by corruption and patronage and thus “a
major constraint on sustainable development.” According to NEPAD,
while the neo-liberal economic restructuring of the 1980s–90s was meant
16)
17)
18)

NEPAD 2001.
NEPAD 2001, pp. 5–6.
NEPAD 2001, p. 5.
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to reconstitute African political economies, leading them to a dynamic
capitalist path, it did not lead to a fundamental shift in the continent’s
economic structures thus there remains an
urgent need to implement far-reaching reforms: Structural adjustment programmes . . .
provided only a partial solution. They promoted reforms that tended to remove serious price distortions, but gave inadequate attention to the provision of social services.
Consequently, only a few countries managed to achieve sustainable higher growth
under these programmes.19

Architects of NEPAD do not stop at articulating the historical developments that have generated obstacles for the continent’s development, they
are keenly looking forward and asking, “What is to be done?” – to borrow
a pertinent phrase from Vladimir Lenin. On this front they see the current
phase of globalization as oﬀering an opening not only for the continent’s
economic development, but also for it to join and take on an important
role in the ‘global body politic.’ So what is to be done for African countries
to make a sound transition to capitalist modernity? According to NEPAD
the measures that are needed to address the continent’s underdevelopment
encompass reforms in the economic and political arena and the formation
of ‘a new partnership’ between African states and their global North counterparts. The NEPAD initiative proposes several economic and political
measures to facilitate not only Africa’s economic recovery but also the
emergence of sustainable economic growth. Here we concentrate on four
measures that NEPAD’s advocates claim will lead to a new era in Africa’s
development.
A ﬁrst measure is a rethinking of the continent’s integration into the
global system in the contemporary phase of globalization. For African
political elites, African countries can beneﬁt from developments generated
by neo-liberal globalization such as new technologies and economic production methods. In order for this to happen they argue that the integration of Africa countries need to be rethought since it has historically
generated inequality. In their view, what is needed is a new integration
framework that views this process from a global interdependence perspective. Such an approach to global integration would take as its starting point
the reality of “global interdependence with regard to production and
demand, the environmental base that sustains the planet, cross-border
19)

NEPAD 2001.
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migration, [and] a global ﬁnancial architecture that rewards good socioeconomic management.”20
A second measure, which in a way derives from NEPAD’s call for an
interdependence approach to globalization, is the redeﬁnition of the
relationship between African states and their global North counterparts,
which NEPAD argues has historically been marked by inequality due to
the global power asymmetry that has characterized the evolution of the
global system. For African states, what is needed is ‘a new partnership’
between African countries, the global North and the leading global governance institutions. In this respect, such a partnership would require
the global North “to reverse the decline in ODA ﬂows to Africa and to
meet the target level of ODA ﬂows equivalent to 0.7 per cent of each
developed country’s gross national product (GNP) within an agreed
period.”21 Further, the partnership would involve a more progressive
approach to addressing development problems generated by the debt
overhang that most African countries face, by having countries in the
global North and multilateral institutions increase “aid ﬂows [that would]
be used to complement funds released by debt reduction for accelerating
the ﬁght against poverty.”22 In addition, this new partnership would seek
to address the unequal nature of the contemporary international trading
system by having global North countries admitting goods from African
countries to their markets and seeking “more equitable terms of trade for
African countries within the WTO multilateral framework.”23 Last but
not least, this partnership would see African political elites working collaboratively with their counterparts in the North in eﬀorts to push and
encourage private capital involvement in African countries with the
World Bank and other international ﬁnancial institutions playing a central role in this process.24
Taking ‘ownership’ of the development process by African peoples and
their leaders is a third measure proposed by NEPAD advocates. In this
regard, NEPAD declares that a time has come for Africans to be agents
of their own destiny and to “understand that development is a process
of empowerment and self-reliance” which requires that Africans “not be
20)
21)
22)
23)
24)

NEPAD 2001, p. 8.
NEPAD 2001, p. 53.
NEPAD 2001, p. 54.
NEPAD 2001, p. 53.
NEPAD 2001, pp. 53–54.
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wards of benevolent guardians” but “the architects of their own sustained
upliftment.”25 This spirit of ownership, argue African ruling elites, is
embodied in NEPAD, for the initiative “centres on African ownership and
management of its development process including its relationship with the
global North.” For these elites the NEPAD initiative is a bold turn in their
development thinking as it represents their ﬁrst step in taking responsibility for the continent’s development. For them NEPAD is their pledge
[it is] based on a common vision and a ﬁrm and shared conviction, that they have a
pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and
collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development . . . an agenda for the
renewal of the continent. The agenda is based on national and regional priorities and
development plans that must be prepared through participatory processes involving
the people.”26

A fourth measure is the Peace, Security, Democracy and Political Governance
Initiatives that is aimed at the promotion of democracy, good governance
and peace. While the various components of this initiative are all important, here we will highlight the core elements of the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative since it takes centre stage in the NEPAD
framework. Like the transnational lending community, the architects of
NEPAD claim to strongly endorse political reforms. In this respect, African rulers claim that they are aware and acknowledge that development
will only occur in the context of a political framework that embraces
“democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance.”27
NEPAD also states that African leaders’ pledge
to respect the global standards of democracy, the core components of which include
political pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties and workers’
unions, and fair, open and democratic elections, periodically organized to enable people to choose their leaders freely.28

According to NEPAD advocates, embracing global democratic practices
and other political reforms is the only political option for African countries, since with the end of the Cold War the world community will tolerate
25)
26)
27)
28)

NEPAD 2001, p. 6.
NEPAD 2001, pp. 1 and 10.
NEPAD 2001, p. 17.
NEPAD 2001.
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nothing else. In this respect they claim that the post-1989 world has seen
the deﬁnition of core political concepts such as “democracy and state legitimacy” which must now be accompanied by a demonstration of good governance, “a culture of human rights and popular participation.” With this
development African ruling elites claim that they have instituted political
reforms that are widely “recognized by governments across the world” a
development that according to them has led key players in the global system to view Africa through a new lens as evidenced they claim by developments such as the following: “The United Nations Millennium Declaration,
adopted in September 2000, conﬁrms the global community’s readiness to
support Africa’s eﬀorts to address the continent’s underdevelopment and
marginalisation.”29

NEPAD as a Blueprint for Africa’s Politico-economic Change
As the preceding discussion indicates, the central message of the proponents of NEPAD, both on the continent and outside, is that it provides a
blueprint for Africa’s economic and political transformation that will lead
to an African Renaissance characterized by sustainable economic growth
and democratic political practices. But does the NEPAD initiative provide
an economic and political framework that will facilitate such a renaissance?
Does the framework represent a transformative move in Africa’s development discourse or a consolidation of the contemporary hegemonic neoliberal development paradigm with an indigenous imprint? The paper
contends that, as it stands, the NEPAD framework has several limitations
as a blueprint for political and economic change in Africa. These limitations emerge from: its underestimation of forces that underpin the global
system; the neo-liberal theory that informs NEPAD’s economic framework; its neglect of the class foundations of African states, and its narrow
deﬁnition of democracy.
In terms of Africa’s economic development, NEPAD’s discussion on
the historical origins of the continent’s underdevelopment illuminates an
important historical development that has had a great inﬂuence on Africa’s
development and that challenges the a-historical tendencies of some of
the dominant approaches in studies of the continent’s political economy.
To argue, as some analysts do, that the roots of the continent’s economic
29)

NEPAD 2001, p. 9.
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stagnation lie in postcolonial patterns of accumulation, especially the
neo-patrimonial basis of the African state, which it is claimed are the
“essential operating codes for politics” in the continent, oﬀers only partial
insights.30 The neo-patrimonial foundations of these states have their roots
in the evolution of colonial political economy whose hallmarks were to
limit both the emergence of an independent capitalist class not dependent
on the state for its reproduction, and the development of diversiﬁed economic structures. NEPAD’s historical approach to the question of underdevelopment further challenges the hegemonic neo-liberal development
perspective which considers colonialism and other local-global structural
and political conditions irrelevant to our understanding of Africa’s development crisis.
NEPAD’s foregrounding of the historical roots of Africa’s development
crisis leads to its call for a rethinking of the relationship between African
countries and the global North. As it astutely argues, this relationship has
been marked by inequality, with the global North forcing its own development visions on African countries and supporting an international economic
architecture that has continuingly deepened the continent’s marginalization. What is needed then, as mentioned earlier, is a new framework that
outlines responsibilities and obligations for African and global North
states. The call for ‘a new partnership’ may be all very well and good on
paper, but it reﬂects a major departure from NEPAD’s grasp of the profound ways in which the economic, political and ideological foundations
that underpin the global system shape Africa’s political and economic
development. After stating how Africa’s integration into the global system
has been marked by ‘exclusion,’ NEPAD’s architects now envision a new
era whereby the modalities of global capitalism can be tamed by a civil
dialogue and gentlemen’s agreements between African elites and their
global North counterparts.
The notion that at this global conjuncture the forces of global capital
can be persuaded to become partners with African states and contribute to
the continent’s recovery and development demonstrates the many limitations and contradictions that pepper the NEPAD initiative. For instance,
the initiative does not explain how the competition that has marked the
evolution of global capitalism would suddenly not set structural limits for
Africa’s development, and why forces of global capital would be willing,

30)

Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, p. 63.
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given their search for expansion and proﬁts, to facilitate the continent’s
development. Global capitalism involves competition, not only among
local ﬁrms, but international ones, and also among nations. As an early
analyst of the rise of global capitalism astutely observed:
the development of capitalist production makes it constantly necessary to keep increasing the amount of capital laid out in a given industrial undertaking, and competition
makes . . . competition to be felt by each individual industrial capitalist as external
coercive laws . . . compels him to keep constantly extending his capital, in order to
preserve it, but extend he cannot except by means of progressive accumulation.31

Thus capitalism as a mode of production remains a spectre of competition
which continues to incorporate various parts of the world into the global
capitalist order unevenly and under unequal terms. Consequently, the rhetorical of free trade, global village and interdependence notwithstanding,
the process continues deepening the historical economic divide between
the global North and global South, a reality that is captured by one of
NEPAD’s organic intellectuals, Thabo Mbeki, in his constant critique of
the contemporary global system as being marked by “global apartheid” – a
system that “has pity neither for beautiful nature nor for living human
beings.”32
NEPAD supporters’ underestimation of how the imperatives of global
capital limit the emergence of ‘a new partnership’ between African countries and the global North, extends to its claim that a partnership can
emerge between African states and institutions of global governance. As
mentioned earlier, these supporters claim that the embrace of market-led
development and good governance measures have resulted in global governance institutions viewing African countries through a new lens. But the
empirical evidence stemming from the eﬀorts of global South states and
civil society actors to craft a civilized dialogue with the global North and
institutions of global governance demonstrate otherwise and make the
claims of African states ring hollow. A few examples will suﬃce here. In the
last decade or so, civil society groups have been involved in a persistent
struggle for the democratization of leading institutions of global governance to address what they deem as a serious case of ‘democratic deﬁcient’

31)
32)

Marx 1961, p. 592.
Mbeki 2002.
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in the way these institutions are governed.33 In addition, the promotion of
“unregulated economic globalization” by these institutions, a process that
is generating deep social dislocations, is another source of discontent
between these institutions and groups in civil society.34
It is important to note the nature of civil society’s engagement with
leading international institutions varies depending on the institution, the
nature of issues that frame the dialogue and the global political conjuncture. In the speciﬁc case of the World Trade Organization’s involvement
with transnational civil society, the process has been generated through
major critiques by groups in transnational civil society and intellectuals
who have highlighted the asymmetrical nature of the international trading
regime. From its establishment in the immediate post-1945 period, this
regime has served and reﬂected the needs and interests of dominant transnational interests drawn mainly from the industrialized North at the
expense of countries in the developing world. Thus, contemporary challenges presented by transnational civil society to the WTO – from the
ministerial meetings in Singapore and beyond – have a long history, but
the intensity of the undemocratic and unjust nature of this international
trading regime has been shaped by the nature of the current stage of
globalization.
Since its inception in 1994 the World Trade Organization has used an
inclusion/exclusion strategy in its involvement with transnational civil
society. The founding moment of the WTO’s strategy with transnational
civil society was in 1996, when the institution issued guidelines that were
to govern its relationship with this community. The six guidelines stipulated that ﬁrst, the WTO’s association with non-state actors was to be at
the ‘discretion of the organization, and the latter would only be involved
in a dialogue with non-state actors who showed ‘concern’ with the central
issues of the WTO.35 Second, non-state actors involved in the dialogue
had to play an important role in disseminating information about the
WTO; and third, the latter would become more transparent by making its
documents increasingly available on its website.36 The fourth guideline
spelled out speciﬁc ways in which the relationship between the WTO and

33)
34)
35)
36)

Beetham 1998, p. 67.
Murphy 2000, p. 789.
Wilkinson 2005, p. 163.
Wilkinson 2005, p. 163.
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non-state actors would develop mainly through the WTO’s organized
“issue-speciﬁc symposia.”37 Fifth, WTO staﬀ who participated in dialogues
with non-state actors would do so in a ‘personal’ capacity.38 The last guideline stipulated that “under no circumstances” would non-state actors be
engaged in “the work of the WTO or its meetings.”39 The preceding clearly
indicates the limited room for maneuver for transitional civil society actors
in their engagement with the WTO. What has occurred since the establishment of the guidelines is that non-state actors whose agenda is closer to
that of the WTO are legitimized and those that raise questions are delegitimized. Global political shifts that have emerged post-September 11
have also tempered criticism of the organization, thus giving it no incentive to engage in institutional reforms.40
The other global institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, have also
increasingly adopted the strategy of engaging transnational civil society.
These two institutions have been criticized mainly for their lack of accountability and their endorsement of global neoliberalism. In terms of representation, countries that have what Ngaire Woods terms the most ‘intensive’
relationship with these organizations are inadequately represented on their
Executive Boards.41 In the context of representation in these two institutions, African countries are the most underrepresented. For example, “The
21 anglophone members of the IMF, 11 of whom have ‘an intense’ relationship with the IMF, are represented by one Executive Director.”42 The
same countries, including the Seychelles, are represented by one Executive
Director at the World Bank. This power asymmetry has led transnational
civil society to call for reforms in the structure of these two institutions.
The IMF and the World Bank have in the past few years opened up spaces
for dialogue with transnational civil society. Both institutions have made
attempts to provide information on their activities and to hold biannual
meetings with some members of transnational civil society. While these
eﬀorts mark a signiﬁcant development given the history of secrecy in these
institutions, it would be naïve to think that their practices will become
democratic in the near future. As Ngaire Woods declares, even with recent
37)
38)
39)
40)
41)
42)

Wilkinson 2005, p. 163.
Wilkinson 2005, p. 165.
Wilkinson 2005, p. 165.
Wilkinson 2005, p. 170.
Woods 2001, p. 84.
Woods 2001, p. 85.
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developments, non-state actors “have not taken a place as major ‘stakeholders’ in the institutions: they have not acquired control, nor a formal
participatory role in decision-making.”43
Lest we repeat the analytical errors of scholars who place the problems
of creating ‘a new partnership’ for Africa’s development on the shoulders of
external forces, it is important that we explore the reasons underpinning
African states’ claim that ‘a new partnership’ is possible between them and
the dominant forces that shape the global system. While not denying that
African states, like other states elsewhere, have to ﬁnd ways to solve or
contain accumulation crises and other issues of development, we contend
that the issue at hand for these states is how to achieve political legitimacy
both internally and externally, given the serious crisis of legitimacy they
have had to contend with from the late 1970s due to internal and global
developments. In the main, African political elites are aware that ﬁnding a
solution for the continent’s development crisis at this current global conjuncture calls for the embrace of neo-liberal thinking and practice. Thus
for African states the era of seeking development paths that diverge from
the global norm as epitomized by Julius Nyerere or Thomas Sankara in an
earlier period is deemed as gone. What has emerged in Africa in the era of
NEPAD is that the leading lights of this initiative “talk left and walk right”
as Patrick Bond has argued in various works. Mbeki’s scathing critiques of
market-led development – e.g., “The critically important task to end the
poverty and underdevelopment, in which millions of Africans are trapped,
inside and outside our country, cannot be accomplished by the market. If
we were to follow the prescriptions of neo-liberal market ideology, we
would abandon the masses of our people to permanent poverty and underdevelopment” while referring to himself as a Thatcherite44 – exemplify the
phenomenon that Bond articulates. The fact of the matter is that, given
the nature of the current global conjuncture and the social class bases of
African states, it would be ‘political suicide’ for these states not to embrace
Lady Margaret Thatcher’s mantra, “There is no alternative” to global neoliberalism. Given these political realities it becomes imperative for the African states to construct global capitalist expansion as a process that can be
civilized through the forging of a partnership with the global North and its
attendant institutions.

43)
44)

Woods 2001, p. 96.
Mbekii 2003.
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At the local level, African states’ embrace of global neo-liberalism
through NEPAD has enabled the reproduction of their legitimacy – at
least for the dominant classes – even though the continent continues on
the same economic downward spiral that marked its pre-NEPAD era.
With the launching of NEPAD, African leaders claim that they can deliver
the long-awaited ‘development cake’ since they ‘own’ the continent’s development process. Further, they claim that ‘a new partnership’ with the
global North has emerged, since their NEPAD initiative has been endorsed
by leaders of the global North, as evidenced by the enthusiastic support it
has received from various northern quarters, especially in Canada under
Prime Jean Chrétien, the G8 meetings in Genoa, the European Union,
and in Washington, where one commenter stated, “NEPAD is philosophically spot-on. The US will focus on those emerging markets doing the
right thing in terms of private sector development, economic freedom and
liberty.”45 How long this transnational elite neo-liberal pact will last is
diﬃcult to tell, since African states are facing growing anticapitalist and
anti-globalization social movements. The ability of African states to contain these movements, however, cannot be ruled out, given what has gone
on in Zimbabwe in the last several years and eﬀorts in Malawi to contain
through punitive laws the agenda of progressive social movements.46
Moving beyond the limits of NEPAD’s doctrine of the formation of a
new partnership, the initiative has other limitations as a blueprint for African countries’ politico-economic change. To begin with, its conceptualization of capitalist transformation of African countries falls within the same
narrow parameters advocated by the Washington Consensus. The latter
deems the transition of the continent to capitalist modernity as involving
merely the introduction of ‘market incentives’ in all the key sectors of the
economy and limited investment in social sector development. This limited view of social change stems from the ahistorical and reductionist
nature of the neo-liberal theory of development that underpins NEPAD
and Washington Consensus development frameworks. Both frameworks
view the transition of a society to capitalist modernity as a process that
only requires letting the ‘invisible hand’ of the market determine economic
and social change. NEPAD’s goes even further and claims that what African countries need is ‘far-reaching’ neo-liberal reforms since SAPs did not

45)
46)

See Bond 2004, p. 15.
Sahle 2006.
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go far enough especially in the restructuring of the social service sector
along market lines. That the historical experience of societies that have
undergone capitalist transformation demonstrates a radical transformation
of all aspects of society and the centrality of the state in the process is
ignored by advocates of neo-liberal economic development in Africa and
elsewhere. As Joseph Stiglitz, a former steward of global neo-liberalism,
states in a recent forward to Karl Polanyi’s seminal text:
The advocates of the neoliberal Washington consensus emphasize that it is government interventions that are the source of the problem; the key to transformation is
‘getting prices’ and getting the government out of the economy through privatization
and liberalization. In this view, development is little more than the accumulation of
capital and improvements in the eﬃciency with which resources are allocated – purely
technical matters. This ideology misunderstands the nature of the transformation itself –
a transformation of society, not just of the economy, and a transformation of the
economy that is far more profound than their simple prescriptions would suggest.
Their perspective represents a misreading of history, as Polanyi eﬀectively argues.47

Further, NEPAD’s approach to politico-economic change is deeply reductionist and leads it, like its Washington Consensus counterpart, to conceptualize transition to market-led capitalism as a unilinear process leading all
societies to the last stage of economic development, as W. Rostow articulated almost ﬁfty years ago in his ‘stages of growth’ argument.48 Such an
approach to social change neglects to acknowledge that even the transformation to capitalism in the global North involved complex social processes
that took diﬀerent trajectories. European transitions to capitalist modernity, for instance, took various paths, and were highly mediated processes.
Consequently, in the context of Africa and elsewhere, it would be fruitful
to think of these processes of social change as being complex and taking
diﬀerent trajectories. As H. Cardozo and E. Falleto have argued, these
transformations are mediated by local class structures, cultural practices,
colonial history, and of course the nature of the global political and economic conjuncture.49 Taking such a complex view of politico-economic
change will not only historicize Africa’s development trajectories, but also
Europe’s and America’s transformation to their own forms of capitalism.

47)
48)
49)

Stiglitz 2001, p. xiv.
Rostow 1960.
Cardoso and Faletto 1979.
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Such a development would hopefully contain the simplistic solutions
oﬀered by global neo-liberal architects and their African counterparts as far
as Africa’s transformations are concerned.
NEPAD’s advocates also misrepresent the transformative potential of
the social forces closely linked to African states. In essence, their claim that
African states are committed to leading their societies to a new era of development marked by equality and ‘people-centred’ development ignores the
social bases of these states. This approach to African states represents them
as institutions that ﬂoat above history and class dynamics. In the case of
the latter, for instance, the class foundations of the initiative were embedded from the beginning, for the process leading to the adoption of the
NEPAD framework was initiated and framed by members of the continent’s
ruling classes. Throughout the framing process, for instance, civil society
groups were never consulted. Further, like the architects of earlier and contemporary hegemonic theories of development, modernization and neoliberalism respectively, proponents of NEPAD consider ruling elites as the
main agents of social change in Africa.
In the political arena NEPAD claims, as mentioned earlier, that the
continent has entered a new political age marked by democracy, respect for
human rights, and search for peace. Yet, from Malawi to Nigeria and places
in between, Africa’s so called democratic regimes have all the markings of
‘illiberal’ democracies.50 In the case of Nigeria, the return of President
Obasanjo to oﬃce was characterized by what internal and external observers termed as ‘massive irregularities.’ Electoral records in the southern River
State, for instance, indicated “a near 100 per cent turnout with 2.1 million
of 2.2 million registered voters supporting President Obasanjo,” a result
that contradicts the low turnout trend recorded by observers in the state;
and in Obasanjo’s home region he “won 1,360,170 votes against his opponent’s 680.”51 Confronted with questions about the legitimacy of the election results given the irregularities that characterized them, not just in his
home state but in others as well, President Obasanjo oﬀered a ‘cultural’
explanation: “Certain communities in this country make up their minds
to act as one in political matters. . . . They probably don’t have that kind of
culture in most European countries.”52 These comments roll oﬀ the tongue
50)

Zakaria 1997.
IRIN news service, 12 May 2003 and Mail and Guardian, 26 April 2003, respectively,
quoted in Bond 2004, p. 18.
52)
IRIN news service, 12 May 2003.
51)
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of one of the framers of NEPAD and a self-proclaimed leading force in the
African Renaissance project. The same undemocratic trend and return to
authoritarian tendencies is also evident in Kenya. In 2006, faced with a
major political crisis generated by questions surrounding his response to
corruption in his government with the emergence of Githongo’s report,
Mwai Kibaki’s regime has returned to the old repressive ways of Kenyatta
and Moi eras. In the middle of the night in early March, the regime
had workers of the media outlets of the The Standard Group attacked by
hooded men. During these raids workers at The Standard newspapers
were ordered to lie down by men carrying AK-47s, who went on to burn
newspapers meant for delivery the following day and arrest three journalists. Yet the regime’s response through its Internal Security Minister, John
Michuku, was that “the raids were designed to protect state security.”53
With national and global criticism of this incident and the increasing
intolerance of independent media and dissent in the country, Kibaki’s
regime responded by stating that it was committed to the “promotion of
responsible journalism.”54
The class bases of African ruling elites’ commitment to democratic politics and their disrespect of the popular will is also clearly evident in their
stipulation in the NEPAD blueprint that they hold each accountable for
the deepening of democracy and other good governance practices. According to NEPAD, this is to be achieved through the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM). Thus far, African leaders have ignored their muchtouted APRM framework. The support of Robert Mugabe’s autocratic rule
in Zimbabwe by Mbeki and other African political elites demonstrates
how rhetorical their support for democracy and respect for human rights
is. For several years now Mugabe has consolidated his power in an authoritarian political structure that has no regard for basic human rights, let
alone the broader human rights embodied in second and third generation
human rights discourses. Yet, at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, Mbeki had no qualms stating that the push to suspend
Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth was nothing but sheer racism on the
part of the leaders of the White Commonwealth. This resorting to claims
of White Commonwealth racist conspiracy ignores facts pertaining to the
March 2002 presidential elections in Zimbabwe. As various observers have

53)
54)

BBC news, 2 March 2006 and The Standard, 3 March 2006.
Mutahi Kagwe, Kenya’s Information Minister, BBC news, 2 March 2006.
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stated, intimidation and other forms of state-sponsored terror characterized these elections. According to one report,
The Presidential election was marred by a high level of politically motivated violence
and intimidation. . . . We were concerned that the legislative framework within which
the elections were conducted, particularly certain provisions of the Public Order and
Security Act and the General Laws Amendment Act, was basically ﬂawed. Limitations
on the freedom of speech, movement and of association prevented the opposition
from campaigning freely.55

While Mugabe continues to deepen his autocratic rule, his NEPAD colleagues are silent or, like Mbeki, claim they believe in “quiet diplomacy.”
In 2005, for instance, Mugabe continued his policy of gross violation
of human rights by ordering the destruction of homes of the most marginalized communities in Harare under his regime, so-called “Operation
Murambatsvina-Shona” or “drive out trash” campaign. But African elites
have thus far not called for political sanctions or any other disciplinary
measure and nor have their global ‘partners’ called for regime in Zimbabwe.
The emergence of limited forms of democracy is not surprising if one
takes a careful look at the nature of the democracy that is being promoted
in the era of neoliberal globalization. Elites drawn from government and
business sectors are deemed by the transnational lending community to be
the central players in the establishment of democracy in the developing
world. As the World Bank declared in 1989, “A common mistake is to
ignore local leadership, often on the grounds that it is exploitative. . . . On
the contrary, studies show that working with existing leaders” yields better
results.56 The intellectual origins of the international lending community’s
democratisation campaign make it clear that underlying the push for
peripheral democratisation is the stabilisation of the existing economic
and social system, and hence the interests of capital at both the local and
international levels.57 In addition, like its view of market economic reforms,
the community’s view of democratisation in Africa and elsewhere in the
global South is not that of a historical and social process; rather their idea
is that as long as there are local elites who are interested in implementing
procedural democracy, liberal democracy can generally operate.58
55)
56)
57)
58)

Star, Johannesburg, 31 March 2002.
Quoted in Sahle (forthcoming). World Bank 1989, p. 61.
See for example, Huntington 1991.
See Sahle (forthcoming).
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Concluding Notes
This paper has attempted to demonstrate the ways in Africa states have
responded to the current phase of globalization. As the discussion has indicated, these states have been heavily involved in the process and have used
their political agency in eﬀorts to reproduce themselves given the nature of
the contemporary global conjuncture. The paper has also challenged the
claims by African states as outlined in the NEPAD initiative and has demonstrated its limitations as a tool for Africa’s transformation along democratic and equitable lines. Finally the paper has also highlighted how in
very profound ways the NEPAD initiative represents the recycling of the
hegemonic neo-liberal development and thus oﬀers not a new start for the
continent but a deepening of neo-liberal political and economic practices
in the continent.
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